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1. Background
The Lembaga Perkreditan Desa (LPD)
1 in Bali are the most recent form of local
finance in Indonesia. Their establishment was initiated by the provincial
government of Bali after several studies on local financial institutions in Indonesia
had been presented at a seminar carried out by the Ministry of Home Affairs in
1984.
2 By 1992, the government had established 650 of the 1,600 LPDs planned to
be set up in each desa adat (custom village).
In 1989, the 'Project Linking Banks and Self-Help Groups' (PHBK), carried
out by the central bank, Bank Indonesia, in order to provide viable financial services
to small farmers and microentrepreneurs, started to cooperate with the Regional
Development Bank (BPD) in integrating LPDs into the linkage program. The BPD
linkage scheme includes only LPDs with earning assets of below Rp 25 million.
Loans disbursed to these LPDs are refinanced by the BPD that receives 80 % of the
total loan amount in the form of Bank Indonesia liquidity credit. LPDs forward loan
applications to the BPD with an attached list of individual borrowers. The loan
contract is signed by the head of the LPD. The BPD offers credit ceilings and loans
with fixed installments. The loan period is fixed at 12 months. Interests on loan vary
between 23 % and 27 % effective per annum. LPD pay an one percent provision on
the loan principal. The BPD linkage scheme is a pure credit scheme, which is not
related to savings mobilization in general and the requirement of blocked savings in
particular. On the level of the LPD loan conditions are determined by deliberation
of the desa adat. Usually, loans are lent on with maturities of 10 to 12 months and
an interest rate of 3.5 % declining per month. Between one and three percent of the
loan amount is retained as compulsory savings.
As of September 1992, the BPD had disbursed Rp 715 million to 80 LPDs
and loans outstanding to 28 LPDs amounted to Rp 112 million. The average loan
size per LPD was Rp 9 million. Considering an average individual loan size of Rp
                                                          
1 Literally, Lembaga Perkreditan Desa can be translated as 'Village Credit Institution'. I prefer to refer to
LPDs as 'Community Financial Institutions' for two reasons: 1) LPDs are owned and managed by the
village community; while 'village' describes only their area of operation, 'community' is used for
emphasizing its social character; 2) LPDs are independent financial institutions which intermediate
between savers and borrowers; their credit operations depend mainly on savings mobilized as their major
source of funds.
2 Research results and contributions to the seminar have been published in Mubyarto dan E.S. Hamid,
eds. 1986. Kredit Pedesaan di Indonesia. Yogyakarta: BPFE, P3PK Universitas Gadjah Mada.2
250,000, an approximate number of 3,000 borrowers had been reached through the
BPD linkage scheme. Taking into account an average of 220 households per desa
adat about 20 % of the households in the concerned LPD areas had received loans,
while the demand for credit was estimated to cover 60 % to 75 % of the households.
As of September 1992, 6 of the 28 LPDs with loans outstanding were responsible
for arrears amounting to Rp 26 million. Three of these LPDs, which were
responsible for two thirds of the total arrears, were located in the economically less
favorable eastern district of Karangasem.
The first draft of this paper was prepared in 1992 for assessing the adequate-
ness of the BPD linkage scheme and presenting results from case studies on LPDs
which were affected by arrears. This working paper includes further information on
the general role and development of LPDs in Bali and adds some findings from
three village studies carried out in 1993.
2. Legal Framework, Role and Development of LPDs
LPDs are semiformal financial institutions which do not fall under the banking law
but are regulated by provincial government law. The establishment of LPDs was
decided upon by the provincial government in 1984 and their operation was
regulated in subsequent provincial laws.
3 The objective of establishing LPDs in
each of the 1,600 desa adat (custom village) has been to fight exploitative forms of
credit relations, to increase the living standard of the village population and to
strengthen village finance in general and microenterprise finance in particular. In
order to achieve these objectives the government provides a starting capital of Rp 2
million for each LPD and has established special supervision and guidance teams at
all government levels, which cooperate with the Regional Development Bank
(BPD) in providing technical and financial support to LPDs.
LPDs are community financial institutions which are owned, managed and
used by the members of the desa adat. As local and user-owned financial
institutions, they have an intimate knowledge of their customers and rely on
mechanisms of social control and joint responsibility. Easily available client
                                                          
3 Keputusan Gubernur Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Bali, Nomor 972, Tahun 1984; Peraturan Nomor 06
Tahun 1986 tentang Kedudukan, Fungsi dan Peranan Desa Adat sebagai Kesatuan Masyarakat Hukum
Adat dalam Popinsi Bali; Peraturan Daerah Propinsi Daerah Tingkat I Bali, Nomor 2, Tahun 1988
tentang Lembaga Perkreditan Desa.3
information, close distances to their customers, simple procedures, familiar staff and
social control reduce transaction costs, operational risks and collateral requirements
so that they are able to function as financial intermediaries for poorer sections of the
population as well. LPDs are managed by a committee consisting of at least a
chairman, treasurer and bookkeeper. Committee members are elected during a
village meeting by the members of the desa adat for a four years period. Decisions
with regard to planning, implementation and reporting are taken by the desa adat
and confirmed by the district head. Profits of the LPD are to be distributed
according to a fixed allocation key: 40 % for general reserves, 25 % of special funds
(for social, etc., purposes), 20 % for village development, 10 % for salaries, and 5 %
for external guidance.



















The LPD approach has a unique character and, though initiated and supervised from
outside, it is based on local needs and directed towards the development of a
decentralized financial system. The unique character of the LPD lies in the fact that
it is not related to the official village administration (desa dinas) but is an
institutional element of the custom village
4 (desa adat). The character of the desa
adat as a democratic system regulated by customary law provides strong
sociocultural bonds and effective control mechanisms. The LPD is not only the
most recent but, along with financial self-help groups, also the most democratic
form of local finance in Indonesia.
The first LPDs were established in 1984 and their number increased to 161 as of
March 1988. After the Provincial Government had reinforced its policy by targeting
the establishment of one LPD in each desa adat, the number of LPDs increased
rapidly to 676 as of March 1993. From March 1988 to March 1993, total assets
boosted from Rp 2.9 billion to Rp 53.4 billion, savings increased from Rp 1.8
billion to Rp 39.5 billion, loans outstanding increased from Rp 2.5 billion to Rp
39.6 billion, and capital, reserves and current profits from Rp 0.8 billion to Rp 12
billion.
Selected Indicators of LPD Development
5
 No. of LPDs March 1985    March 1988    March 1991    March 1993
 Total assets 69.2 million 2.9 billion 21.8 billion 53.4 billion
 Bank deposits 4.7 million 91.3 million 1.5 billion 11.1 billion
 Loans outstanding 58.7 million 2.5 billion 18.8 billion 39.6 billion
 Savings & deposits 44.3 million 1.8 billion 14.7 billion 39.6 billion
 Equity & reserves 18.1 million 504 million 3.5 billion 7.8 billion
 Current profits 6.1 million 340 million 2.0 billion 4.2 billion
                                                          
4 Desa adat is often translated as ‘traditional village’. Warren introduced the term ‘custom village’ in
order to emphasize that “adat is neither an ‘invented tradition’ of external construction nor a seamless or
changeless ‘past in the present’, but a powerful framework of meaning and social action” (Warren, C.
1993. Adat and Dinas. Balinese Communities in the Indonesian State. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University
Press, p. 5).
5 Source: Bank Indonesia and Bank Pembangunan Daerah, various statistical reports.5
3. Findings from Field Visits and Case Studies
In the following I shall present findings from three field visits in 1991, 1992 and
1993. The first visit was restricted to short interviews with managers of three LPDs.
The second visit to three other LPDs was intended to analyze their financial
development in more detail because they were involved in the linkage project and
were affected by arrears. During the third visit I carried out several case studies
which compared the role and development of LPDs and financial self-help groups
in several Balinese villages. This paper summarizes only some preliminary results
of these studies.
3.1 First Observations in three LPDs in the Badung District
The LPDs visited (desa adat Anggabaya, Tedung, Tengkulak) were established
between 1989 and 1991. Their area of operation covers the area of one desa adat
with 150 to 350 households or 500 to 1,000 inhabitants. The three management
members had been selected from the desa adat, and they were assisted by two or
three mobile staff members which were responsible for the mobilization of savings
and collection of loans. Operational decisions were taken by the desa adat, while
the role of government institutions seemed to be restricted to guidance and
supervision. The LPDs had a proper book- keeping system, which was supervised
by the Regional Development Bank. Savings were collected in three forms:
compulsory savings, which were deductions (1-3 %) from each loan disbursement,
voluntary savings and time deposits. About 90 % of total savings were made up of
voluntary savings mobilized by mobile staff. Depending on the type of savings,
interests on savings ranged between one to two percent per month. The LPDs
offered two credit schemes, a monthly and a seasonal scheme, but the vast majority
of loans were effected with monthly repayment schedules. The loan maturity ranged
between 4 and 12 months. Depending on the credit scheme, the loan period and loan
size, interests on loans varied between 3.5 %/month on balance (declining) and  3 %
/month on the loan principal (flat).
The LPDs had received loans from the Regional Development Bank in the
middle of 1991. These loans were effected with a loan maturity of 12 months and an
effective interest rate of 23 % per annum. The loan amount disbursed varied from
Rp 5 million to Rp 10 million per LPD. These BPD loans were lent on to 836
individual customers, and the individual loan amount ranged from Rp 50,000 to Rp
1 million. The avarage loan amount per borrower was Rp 250,000. In all LPDs, the
average loan size disbursed in the framework of the linkage project was twice as
large as the average loan size prior to the linkage project (Rp 122,000). One reason
for this growth was the prior scarcity of loan funds. Since the distribution of loans
below and above the Rp 250,000 line (75%:25%) did not change considerably over
time, it may be assumed that access to outside credit led to a more adequate finance
of both relatively 'small' and 'large' borrowers.
About 37 % of the population in the three villages had savings accounts and
17 % of them had loan accounts with the three LPDs. More than half of the LPDs'
customers were net savers, who held savings averaging to Rp 43,000. Interlending
practices between LPDs and of LPDs with other institutions, such as village
cooperatives, indicate that the credit demand of the desa adat members exceeds the
savings mobilizing capacity of the LPDs. Assuming that only 100 households per
desa adat demand an average annual loan amount of Rp 250,000, each LPD would
need funds amounting to Rp 25 million per annum, an amount that exceeded the
average size of outside credit (Rp 9 million) by far.
The LPDs' earning assets consist of loans outstanding (90 %) and bank
deposits (10 %). Sources of the earning assets were savings (55 %), reserves incl.
current profits (26 %), and outside credit (19 %). Depending on the repayment
schedules, the proportions of reserves/profits and outside credit are either increasing
or decreasing. With an outside credit of Rp 10 million, the assets of the three LPDs
would increase by Rp 9 million annually. From this calculation it follows that an
LPD with earning assets of only Rp 16 million (i.e., Rp 3 million in bank deposits
and Rp 12 million in loans outstanding) would already fall out of the target group of
the BPD linkage scheme, although only 30 % of their customers had been served
only once in the framework of the linkage project.
Conclusions: As user-owned and culturally embedded 'Community Financial
Institutions', the LPDs in Bali are one of the most promising approach in local
finance in Indonesia. The BPD linkage scheme may contribute to the strengthening
of this approach. The Regional Development Bank is the only bank that can provide
both appropriate financial and technical services to LPDs. However, it is important
that the BPD fully recognizes the important role of LPDs as local financial and7
savings mobilizing institutions rather than to use them as credit channels. The BPD
should adjust its interests on loans to market rates in order to instill savings
mobilization efforts in LPDs. Loans disbursed to LPDs should correspond to the
LPDs savings mobilization, and the LPDs should be required to deposit 10 % to 20
% of their liabilities in BPD accounts. The BPD linkage scheme should guarantee
both the liquidity of the LPDs and the security of funds deposited by the LPDs'
customers. Well functioning LPDs should be provided with flexible refinancing
facilities, while others should be supported in improving their savings instruments.
3.2 Case Studies on the Financial Development of three LPDs affected by
Arrears in the Karangasem District
LPD Desa Adat Nongan
The LPD Nongan was established in December 1990 and received two BPD loans.
The first loan (Rp 5 million) was disbursed only one month after the set up of the
LPD and the second loan (Rp 5 million) was disbursed in July 1991. The first loan
was lent on to a group of cattle breeders. As of June 1991, Rp 3.7 million of this
loan was in arrears. The second loan was used to cover the remaining balance of the
group loan, while Rp 6.3 million were lent on to individual borrowers. As of
September 1992, debts and arrears of the BPD loan amounted to Rp 3.3 million.
Loans outstanding amounted to Rp 18.5 million of which 16.7 % (Rp 3.1 million)
was categorized as unsound. Previous observations showed that individual loans
amounts increased considerably with the new access to outside credit, whereas the
distribution of loans to loan size classes did not change much. The example of LPD
Nongan confirms this finding. Prior to the BPD loan in June 1991 the average loan
size was Rp 76,000, whereas the BPD loan was lent on with loan amounts
averaging to Rp 146,000. Prior to the BPD loan, 67.5 % of all loans were disbursed
with amounts of below Rp 50,000 and only 0.5 % with loan amounts higher than Rp
200,000. As of September 1992, these figures had changed to 61 % and 3.5 %.
Solvability: The LPD's loan disbursements increased from Rp 14 million (as of
June 1991) to Rp 50 million (as of September 1992). The amount of loans8
outstanding increased from Rp 10 million to between Rp 17 million and 18 million
in 1992. This development was supported by higher interest income and an
improved savings mobilization. The savings to outside credit ratio changed from
4:10 in July 1991 to 10:3 in September 1992. While in July 1991 savings
contributed only 29 % to the loan portfolio, this proportion increased to 54 % in
September 1992. The overall debt to equity ratio decreased from 3.2 to 2.6, and the
outside credit to equity ratio from 2.8 to 0.6. This change indicates an increasing
degree of self-sustainability. The increasing role of savings, however, points also to
a higher degree of risk and responsibility with regard to funds mobilized from the
community. Both the growth of loans outstanding and savings expose the LPD to
higher risks of securing these savings and sustaining credit repayment. The risks
mentioned above are not reflected in the LPD's asset structure. Between June 1991
and September 1992, total assets increased from Rp 10 million to Rp 19.6 million,
and the proportion of the loan portfolio in total assets increased from 92 % to 96 %.
Thus, almost all funds were directly lent on. As of September 1992, the LPD owed
only Rp 425,000 in cash and held only Rp 319,000 in the BPD savings accounts.
These amounts were not adequate a) to provide a sufficient collateral-substitute for
the BPD, b) to provide sufficient security for savers, and c) to manage the
increasing credit risks.
Liquidity: The situation described above involves also a liquidity problem. Taking
into account the possibility of larger savings withdrawals combined with increasing
credit collection problems, the prevailing degree of liquidity will not be sufficient to
meet the need of both savers and borrowers. The fact that almost all savings are
immediately converted into loans point to a high credit demand and to a structural
liquidity squeeze of the LPD. Since the first BPD loan was also not able to solve
this problem, a more stable type of refinance seems to be necessary. Almost all
assets were made up of the loan portfolio. Regarding the loan portfolio as current
assets, the current assets to debt ratio was stable and sufficient: 1.3 in the third
quarter of 1991 and 1.4 in the third quarter of 1992. However, excluding the loan
portfolio these ratios would be only 0.11 and 0.06. This shows that the asset
structure was not only highly dominated by the loan portfolio but also that the
LPD's liquidity was highly dependent on its loan collection performance.9
Profitability: The average quarterly net income of the LPD Nongan doubled from
Rp 518,000 in the second quarter of 1991 to Rp 1.1 million in the second quarter of
1992. Since the average equity, total assets and earning assets increased also by
almost 100 %, the LPD's profitability showed only a slow growth. The return of
equity increased from 20.3 % to 22.3 %, the return on assets increased from 4.9 %
to 5.7 %, and the return on earning assets increased from 5.2 % to 6.1 %.
Conclusions: The BPD loan enabled the LPD to expand its credit business. The
LPD's arrears, liquidity problem and asset structure, however, show that this
expansion is exposed to high risks. Without a sufficient financial backup arrears
reached directly the bank level. The security of savings mobilized from the
community was severely questioned and the extension of loans has to slow down.
LPD Desa Adat Sukahet
The LPD Sukahet was also established in December 1990 and received one BPD
loan (Rp 10 million) in July 1991. The BPD loan was lent on with an average loan
size of Rp 180,000, whereas the individual loan size prior to the BPD loan had been
only Rp 80,000. Changes in loan distribution were more pronounced than in the
case of LPD Nongan. Prior to the BPD loan, 51 % of all loans were disbursed with
amounts below Rp 50,000 and only 2 % of the loans were larger than Rp 200,000.
As of September 1992, only 34 % of the loans were smaller than Rp 50,000, while
16 % of the loans were larger than Rp 200,000. As of the same month, arrears and
loans outstanding of the BPD loan amounted to Rp 9 million. No installment was
made since April 1992. Loans outstanding to individual borrowers amounted to Rp
25.4 million, of which 21.6 % (Rp 5.5 million) were categorized as unsound.
Solvability: Between June 1991 and September 1992, loan disbursements boosted
from Rp 23 million to Rp 122 million. Loans outstanding grew from Rp 11 million
to Rp 29 million in May 1992, but decreased to Rp 25 million in September 1992.
This development was related to the initial impact of the BPD loan and a significant
increase in savings mobilization. Although the bank loan was not repaid, the
savings to outside credit ratio changed from 6:10 to 16:9. The contribution of
savings to the loan portfolio increased from 32 % to 61 %. The overall debt to
equity ratio decreased from 4.2 in the third quarter of 1991 to 3.6 in the third quarter10
of 1992, and the outside credit to equity ratio decreased from 2.5 to 1.3. Total assets
grew from Rp 12 million (June 1991) to Rp 32 million (September 1992). The
proportion of the loan portfolio in total assets decreased from 98 % to 79 %, which
indicates an increased financial backup in the form of bank deposits. As of
September 1992, the LPD held Rp 4.4 million in its BPD savings account and Rp
1.4 million in cash.
Liquidity: LPD Sukahet had a much better financial backup than LPD Nongan.
Consequently, the proportion of the loan portfolio in current assets was
considerably lower: 81 % compared to 96 %. The overall liquidity ratio (current
assets to debts) was, as in the case of LPD Nongan, 1.3. Excluding the loan
portfolio from current assets, the ratio was considerably better (0.24) as in the case
of LPD Nongan (0.06) but also not sufficient if the increasing risk and high arrears
ratio is considered.
Profitability: The average quarterly net income increased from Rp 594,000 in the
second quarter of 1991 to Rp 870,000 in the second quarter of 1992. The average
equity increased from Rp 3.9 million to Rp 6.5 million, average total assets grew
from Rp 10.9 million to Rp 28.4 million, and average earning assets grew from Rp
10.4 million to Rp 26.1 million. The relatively lower growth of the net income
resulted in a declining profitability: return on equity declined from 15.2 % to 13.5
%, return on assets declined from 5.4 % to 3.1 %, and return on earning assets
declined from 5.7 % to 3.3 %. One major problem may be seen in the cost structure
of LPD Sukahet. Compared to income, costs increased over-proportionally. The
LPD faced high burdens of operational costs and interests to be paid on savings.
Interests paid on the BPD loan during 1992 made up between 20 % and 35 % of the
LPD's overall costs.
Conclusions: The conclusions drawn for LPD Nongan are also valid for LPD
Sukahet. However, the considerably larger arrears have more seriously affected the
solvability and profitability of LPD Sukahet. The liquidity situation appears to be
more favorable, but this is due to the non-performing BPD loan. The repayment of
this loan would absorb the LPD's savings and cash, would reduce considerably the
liquidity for new loan disbursements, and would consequently reduce income and
would make the asset structure totally dependent on the loan portfolio.11
LPD Desa Adat Padangkerta
The LPD Padangkerta was established in 1990 and received one BPD loan
amounting to Rp 10 million in July 1991. The loan was lent on with an average
individual loan size of Rp 188,000, compared to a previous average loan size of Rp
100,000. Prior to the BPD loan, 36 % of all loans were disbursed with amounts
below Rp 50,000 and 8 % of the loans were larger than Rp 200,000. As of
September 1992, only 25 % of the loans were smaller than Rp 50,000, but 34 % of
the loans were larger than Rp 200,000. As of the same month, loans outstanding of
the BPD loan decreased to 0.6 million, because most of the arrears were repaid in
August and September. Loans outstanding to individual borrowers amounted to Rp
23.7 million, of which 53 % were in arrears. 42 % of the loans were categorized as
unsound and 11 % as doubtful or defaults.
Solvability: With the BPD loan, the volume of loan disbursements increased from
Rp 23 million (June 1991) to Rp 85 million (September 1992). Loans outstanding
grew from Rp 11 million to Rp 29.3 million in May 1992, but declined to Rp 23.7
million in September 1992. While the BPD loan was almost fully repaid in
September 1992, the LPD relied on a rapid increase in savings mobilization.
Savings and deposits grew from Rp 9.5 million (June 1991) to Rp 21.5 million
(September 1992). The savings to outside credit ratio changed drastically from
10:10 to 35:1. The contribution of savings to the loan portfolio increased from 50 %
to 91 %. The overall debt ratio declined slightly from 5.9 in the third quarter of
1991 to 5.6 in the third quarter of 1992, whereas the outside credit to equity ratio
fell from 2.5 to 0.2. As in the case of the other LPDs, this change points to both an
increasing degree of self-finance and an increasing degree of risk for savers. Total
assets doubled from Rp 13.2 million to Rp 26.6 million in September 1992, and the
proportion of the loan portfolio in total assets decreased from 96 % to 94 %. As of
September 1992, the LPD held only Rp 10,000 in its BPD account and Rp 1.4
million in cash, compared to liabilities totaling to Rp 22 million. Thus, as in the
case of LPD Nongan, the degree of financial backup was far from being sufficient.
Liquidity: The LPD's assets are highly dominated by its loan portfolio. While the
general current assets to debt ratio (1.1) was stable and satisfactory, this ratio would
be only 0.06 if the loan portfolio is excluded. The fall in total assets and the loan12
portfolio were related to serious arrears problems. Income and credit installments
could not be used for further lending activities or reserve funds, but had to be used
for credit repayment to BPD. With a decline in current assets, total assets almost
entirely made up by the loan portfolio, and more than half of the loan portfolio in
arrears, LPD Padangkerta faced severe security and liquidity problems.
Profitability: The average quarterly net income of the LPD decreased from Rp
476,000 in the second quarter of 1991 to Rp 447,000 in the second quarter of 1992.
In the third quarter of 1992 the LPD made a loss of Rp 562,000. This loss was
caused by a high growth in interest payments, both for the BPD loan and for
savings, as well as by increasing operational costs. The average equity increased
from Rp 3.5 million in the second quarter of 1991 to Rp 4.6 million in the second
quarter of 1992. Average total assets increased from Rp 11.9 million to Rp 30.2
million, and earning assets from Rp 10.1 million to Rp 27.2 million. The decline in
the net income resulted in a drastic decline in the LPD's profitability: the return on
equity fell from 13.6 % in the second quarter of 1991 to 9.7 % in the second quarter
of 1992 and turned negative (-12.3 %) in the third quarter of 1992. For the same
time periods, the return on assets declined from 4 % to 1.5 % and -2 %, and the
return on earning assets declined from 4.7 % to 1.6 % and -2.2 %.
Conclusions: In the third quarter of 1992 LPD Padangkerta used its own capital to
cover arrears of the BPD loan. Since this repayment was not matched by an
improved repayment performance of individual borrowers, this situation has to be
regarded as a major threat for the LPD's solvability, liquidity and profitability.
About half of its loan portfolio was highly exposed to risk. The debt to equity ratio
was twice as high as for the other LPDs. Savings mobilized from the community
were not adequately secured by liquid moneys and reserves in the form of bank
deposits. The LPD's equity covered only 30 % of the loan amount in arrears.13
3.3 Three Village Studies on the Role of LPDs in the Gianyar, Tabanan and
Karangasem Districts
The eight LPDs visited in 1992 and 1993 are located in the eastern district of
Karangasem and the southern districts of Gianyar and Tabanan. As of December
1992, these LPDs had 2,924 savings customers and 1,814 borrowers with average
loans outstanding of Rp 25 million per LPD or Rp 110,000 per borrower. Individual
loan sizes, effected with maturities of between 6 and 18 months, ranged from Rp
25,000 to Rp 750,000. The average LPD accumulated assets amounting to Rp 30
million of which Rp 23 million were mobilized as savings and time deposits. The
number of savers covered 42 % and the number of borrowers 19 % of the desa adat
households. There is a high variance in the outreach and financial capacity of LPDs.
In most cases the volume of assets generated by also LPDs other than the eight ones
discussed here varied between Rp 20 million to Rp 30 million. A considerable
number of LPDs, however, were either able to accumulate assets of more than Rp
100 million or stagnated at a level below Rp 10 million. While an increasing
number of LPDs approach the financial capacity of small formal financial
institutions, many are comparable to large savings-mobilizing financial self-help
groups, and some stagnate at a level comparable to that of an average financial self-
help group. One factor for explaining this situation may be the variance in external
conditions, such as the competition with other local financial institutions. Another
factor may be seen in the variance in internal conditions, such as the attractiveness
of the savings and credit schemes offered to the desa adat population.
In order to examine the role of LPDs in comparison to financial self-help
groups, three villages were selected in which LPDs faced different development
conditions. The first case, the Lodtunduh village in the district of Gianyar,
represents an example where two LPDs in two desa adat play a minor role in local
finance, whereas the other two cases, the Seraya village in the district of
Karangasem and the Keramas village in the district of Gianyar, the LPDs play a
dominant role.
Lodtunduh is an administrative village that consists of two desa adat and,
therefore, is served by two LPDs. However, when the LPDs were established in the
early 1990s, they had to compete with 9 already well-functioning financial self-help
groups. By 1993, the LPDs held the savings accounts of 307 villagers with a total14
value of only Rp 15.5 million. The financial self-help groups, however, mobilized
savings from their 1,104 members which amounted to Rp 113.7 million. The LPDs’
loan portfolios were made up of 202 borrowers and totaled to Rp 26.3 million,
whereas loans outstanding to 833 borrowers of the financial self-help groups
amounted to Rp 168.8 million. In desa adat Lodtunduh the LPD was not able to
increase its starting capital from the provincial government by more than Rp 1
million during two years. Savings amounting to Rp 243,000 were collected from 28
members and loans outstanding of Rp 2.6 million were provided to 34 members of
the desa adat. Half of the loans outstanding were affected by arrears. The LPD was
not able to make ‘good’ loans because ‘good’ borrowers were organized in financial
self-help groups. In desa adat Mawang the LPD was by far more successful in
developing its own customer base, but the financial self-help groups were still able
to sustain their dominance. The latter were established in the first half of the 1980s
and had accumulated assets of Rp 52.4 million, but the LPD had generated assets of
Rp 27.9 million during just four years although the groups organized almost all
households of the desa adat. The LPD’s entrance into successful competition with
the already established groups was mainly due to two factors which distinguish the
situation in the two desa adat. The first factor was that the groups in desa adat
Lodtunduh were able to meet an increasing credit demand through access to bank
credit that was not available to those in desa adat Mawang. The second factor was
that part of the first groups diversified their savings instruments by providing time
deposit facilities and interest on savings, while this was not the case in desa adat
Mawang. In this situation the LPD offered an interest earning savings scheme which
was also attractive to group members. In order to maintain its member and customer
based the largest financial self-help groups reacted by setting up its own interest
earning savings facility and succeeded to mobilize an additional savings amount of
Rp 7 million in 1993, whereas the LPD’s savings mobilization slowed down.
The LPD Desa Adat Keramas in the Gianyar district started its operation in 1991,
while two financial self-help groups were set up in 1988/89. Although they served
1,154 savers and 510 borrowers, the LPD and the self-help groups had accumulated
assets totaling to only Rp 39.8 million by 1993. 89 % of the borrowers received
small loans of up to Rp 100,000. A comparison between the LPD and the financial
self-help groups shows that savings mobilization considerably influenced their
development. Despite having organized almost all households in two banjars and15
being established earlier than the LPD, the two self-help groups experienced slack
growth in assets, whereas the LPD was able to accumulate Rp 30 million during just
three years of operation. The major reason for this difference was not only the
LPD’s larger area of operation but also its emphasis on savings mobilization. While
the LPD offered an attractive interest earning savings scheme, the self-help groups
did not mobilize voluntary savings. By 1993, the LPD had 778 savings customers
with savings totaling to Rp 21.1 million. With 376 members the groups had a large
customer base, but were able to generate only Rp 6.1 million of compulsory
savings. While the LPD had loans outstanding of Rp 23.4 million to 441 borrowers,
the loan portfolio of the groups was only sufficient to meet the credit demand of 69
members. The financial self-help groups were not able to attract additional savings
and, therefore, to meet the credit demand of their members.
The LPD Desa Adat Seraya in the Karangasem district was established in 1989,
while four financial self-help groups were established in the 1980s. Despite less
favorable economic conditions, the LPD was able to rapidly increase its assets from
Rp 12.2 million in 1989 to Rp 140.9 million in 1993, whereas the financial self-help
groups did not experience a significant growth. With the establishment of the LPD
the groups' capability to mobilize savings stagnated. The LPD services met the
demand of savers and borrowers and were more attractive than those offered by the
self-help groups. While the groups did not pay interest on savings, the LPD offered
interest earning savings and time deposit schemes through which it mobilized 86 %
of its assets. By 1993, the LPD had attracted 1,269 savings customers who had
deposited Rp 120.8 million of savings and time deposits. The groups had 858
members but mobilized savings amounting to just Rp 23.3 million. Thus, the LPD
was also better able to meet the demand for credit. Although its number of
borrowers (472) was similar with that of the groups (403), the LPD’s outstanding
loans were more than four times as high. Although loan uses did not vary
considerably, 80 % of the group borrowers received loan amounts of up to Rp
100,000, whereas half of the LPD loans were larger than Rp 250,000. The
diversification of credit terms reflected the more professional LPD management.
While the groups effected loans with standardized maturities of 10 or 12 months,
the LPD’s borrowers were able to chose between a range of loan maturities.16
Conclusions
Both financial self-help groups and LPDs in Bali have assumed an important role in
local finance. However, financial self-help groups and LPDs have to be regarded as
competing forms of local finance. Within this competition, the LPDs have certain
advantages. First of all, they cover a larger area of operation and are, therefore, able
to develop a larger customer base and higher financial capacity. They offer interest
earning savings schemes which do not exist in many self-help groups. As LPDs are
also embedded in the local community, they are an appropriate alternative for group
members whose financial needs are not met by their groups. The establishment of
competitive financial services and the management of increasing savings and loan
portfolios requires a more professional financial management than is found in many
self-help groups. LPDs are better prepared to professionalize because their financial
operations are institutionally separated from their customers and they enjoy
technical assistance from the regional government and development bank. Above
all, the comparison between LPDs and financial self-help points to importance of
the rural populace's access to appropriate savings instruments and to the crucial role
of savings mobilization in sustaining the service capacity of local financial
institutions and in sustaining the viability of their institutional development under
competitive conditions.